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The intergenerational elasticity of income is generally considered one of the best summary measures
of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity of success to all its members, irrespective
of their family background. We present a parsimonious political economy model and show how the
interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of mobility. Contrary
to what it is generally assumed, a low correlation between father income and son income is not always
desirable, as it may imply more inefficiency due to the distortionary effects of mobility-enhancing
public policies. Moreover, taking into account the heterogeneity in preferences for intergenerational
mobility leads to the conclusion that even if a fully mobile society is desirable ex ante, it may not be
politically sustainable ex post. Our model clarifies the structural parameters behind the widely studied
intergenerational elasticity of income in terms of political economy forces. Finally, we show some
empirical evidence on the relationship between intergenerational elasticity of income across countries



















The intergenerational elasticity of income is generally considered one of the best summary
measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunities of success to all its members,
irrespective of their family background. Starting with pioneering work by Solon (1992) and
Zimmerman (1992), the economic literature has made important advances on the question of
how to measure this parameter using the Galton-Becker-Solon regression:
ys = a + βyf + us (1)
where ys is son’s log income and yf is father’s log income. A lower β denotes a smaller association
between father’s and son’s income and therefore a higher degree of social mobility. As such, a
lower β is often interpreted as being a desirable feature of a society.
While we have learned a lot on how to estimate this reduced-form parameter, less progress
has been made on understanding its underlying structural determinants. What does β actually
measure? Is a lower β necessarily more desirable? Important progress on these questions has
been made by Becker and Tomes (1979), who have shown how the intergenerational persistence
of income reﬂects both “nature and nurture”. In their model individuals are assigned talent
by nature, and parents can add to that talent by privately investing in their children. The
intergenerational transmission of income is therefore a combination of exogenous biological
factors and endogenous optimizing behavior of parents. However, the Becker and Tomes model
generally ignores the role of redistributive policies and their deeper determinants. Redistributive
policies have the potential to play an important role in determining how income is transmitted
from one generation to the next. For example, public education can signiﬁcantly aﬀect economic
opportunities of individuals who come from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds. At the
same time, it can also aﬀect parents’ incentives to privately invest in their children human
capital, both directly and throughout the disincentive eﬀect of taxes. More in general, most
redistributive policies—including taxation, aﬃrmative action, welfare programs, subsidies that
target poor individuals—potentially aﬀect the intergenerational elasticity of income. While
some studies have highlighted the role of public policies as a determinant of social mobility,
most existing studies take these policies as exogenous.
In this paper we use a model with exogenous talent endowments, endogenous parental
investment in children and endogenous redistributive institutions, to identify the structural
parameters that govern the intergenerational mobility. Our framework extends the Becker and
2Tomes framework and clariﬁes how the interaction between private and collective decisions de-
termines the equilibrium level of social mobility. The model allows for a structural interpretation
of the widely studied parameter β. This is important because it allows a better understanding
of the deeper politico-economic determinants of intergenerational mobility and the role of pub-
lic policy. The model also shows how we should interpret and rank diﬀerences over time and
across countries in β. Since redistributive policies generate a trade-oﬀ between insurance and
incentives, the optimal β is not necessarily zero for all societies. In addition, international com-
parisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are shown to be not particularly informative
about fairness without taking into account diﬀerences in politico-economic institutions. The
predictions of the model seem generally consistent with the empirical evidence.
Our framework focuses on how parents transfer economic endowments to their children
through private and collective investment in their human capital. Before having children,
parents know their own genetic ability but are uncertain about their children genetic ability.
Consistent with Becker and Tomes (1979) and Loury (1981), parents can decide to invest
privately in the human capital of their children, given an exogenous degree of transmission of
genetic ability. This private investment oﬀsets some of the risk of having low genetic ability,
thus reducing the probability that an individual might turn out to have low productivity and
therefore low income. Since private investment can oﬀset some but not all of the genetic risk,
parents “under the veil of ignorance” have an incentive to collectively create public institutions
that provide further insurance against the risk of low genetic ability. A natural example of this
type of policy is public education.
We model public education as an insurance system that increases the income of the low
talented children, at the expense of lowering the income of the more talented children. We show
how and why a more progressive educational policy increases social mobility in equilibrium.
The equilibrium level of social mobility depends on the costs and beneﬁts of public education.
This trade-oﬀ is resolved by two forces: (i) the balance between costly insurance and incentives
to privately invest in children’s human capital and (ii) the political process that aggregates
conﬂicting interests regarding the desired degree of social mobility.
A novel insight of our analysis is to show how political economy forces shape the equilibrium
level of social mobility. Even if public education is relatively costless to provide for the average
family, it may hurt the interests of the rich dynasties who, in a world of increased social mobility,
are more likely to move down the income ladder. As a result, the maximum amount of mobility
(β = 0) is not necessarily the equilibrium one, even when public insurance is relatively cheap
3to provide.
More generally, the model shows that existing diﬀerences in β across countries are (at least
in part) governed by all those political institutions that aﬀect public education. Therefore,
two societies with similar fundamentals (such as the degree of parental altruism, variability in
market earnings, degree of biological and cultural transmission of family characteristics, labor
market discrimination, asset market incompleteness etc.) may display very diﬀerent degrees of
intergenerational mobility depending on the identity of the politically decisive family.
In the last part of the paper, we use data on a cross section of countries for which reliable
estimates of β are available to test the predictions of the model. In general, we ﬁnd that they
are consistent with the empirical evidence. For example, our model predicts that in countries
where rich dynasties are more politically active than poor dynasties, social spending for public
education should be lower and therefore income mobility should be lower. We ﬁnd that this
appear to be the case in our sample. The diﬀerence in the probability of party aﬃliation
between rich and poor appears to be strongly correlated with β. Such diﬀerence has ﬁve times
larger predictive power than the rate of return to education, which is often considered as one of
the most prominent determinants of mobility (Solon, 1999, 2004; Corak, 2006). While causality
is obviously unclear, these empirical correlations are at least consistent with our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. In
Section 3 we describe the model and examine its positive properties. In Section 4 we derive
the politico-economic determinants of social mobility and show their relation to the Galton-
Becker-Solon regression. In Section 5 we present our empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes.
All omitted derivations are in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 describes the data.
2 Related Literature
The objective of our model is to derive the structural politico-economic parameters underlying
the intergenerational elasticity of income. This coeﬃcient—β in equation (1)—has been the
main focus of the existing empirical literature, see among others Solon (1992), Zimmerman
(1992), Bj¨ orklund and J¨ antti (1997), Mulligan (1997) and Solon (1999). Our model is also
related to a more recent empirical strand of research that examines within-country trends in
mobility and compares β over time, see for instance Mazumder (2005, 2007), Lee and Solon
(2006), and Aaronson and Mazumder (2008).
Most theoretical work in this area has focused on the role of the genetic transmission of
4ability, the incentives for parental investment, and the role of the asset market in explaining
the intergenerational transmission of income. Our framework builds on the theoretical work
of Becker and Tomes (1979), and on extensions of this work by Goldberger (1989), Mulligan
(1997) and Solon (2004).
While some studies have highlighted the role of public policies as a determinant of social
mobility, most existing studies take these policies as exogenous. Examples of papers that have
argued that institutions may be important determinants of mobility, but take these institutions
as exogenous include, among others, the original contribution of Becker and Tomes (1979),
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini (1999), Solon (1999, 2004),
Davies, Zhang and Zeng (2005), Mayer and Lopoo (2005), and Hassler, Rodriguez Mora, and
Zeira (2007).
In our setting, social mobility depends on public redistributive policies that we model as the
outcome of a politico-economic equilibrium. In this sense, our model relates to the equilibrium
models of Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Persson and Tabellini
(1994). These papers show how cross sectional inequality causes growth, through endogenous
public policies. Benabou (1996) further develops this strand of literature and endogenizes
the relationship between inequality, social mobility, redistribution and growth as a function
of the incompleteness of the ﬁnancial market. While our model abstracts from (physical)
capital accumulation, it emphasizes the endogenous production of human capital (talent) as an
intermediate input for the production of ﬁnal income. Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) analyze a
reform from a locally ﬁnanced to a centralized educational system in a multicommunity model
with endogenous choice of location. Relative to their paper, we instead focus on explaining
cross country outcomes. In this case, migration becomes a less important determinant of
social mobility and diﬀerences in political institutions become stronger determinants of social
mobility. As in our paper, Bernasconi and Profeta (2007) endogenize institutions in a model
with mobility and argue that the politically-determined level of public education may reveal
the true talent of the children and relax the mismatch of talents to occupations. Relative to
this paper, our model includes both economic and political choices.
In a seminal paper, Piketty (1995) explains the emergence of permanent diﬀerences in
attitudes toward redistribution. Benabou and Ok (2001) show how rational beliefs about one’s
relative position in the income ladder aﬀect the equilibrium level of redistribution. These
papers derive the implications of social mobility for redistributive policies, while we focus on
the reverse channel. Speciﬁcally, we analyze how endogenously chosen public policies aﬀect the
5intergenerational mobility.
It is important to note that because the direction of causation in our model diﬀers from the
one emphasized in Benabou and Ok (2001), we obtain a diﬀerent prediction for the relationship
between mobility and redistribution in the US and Europe. In their paper, more mobility is
associated with less redistribution because voters who are below the mean oppose redistribution
in the rational expectation of income gains in the future. This explanation is intuitive, but cross
Atlantic evidence suggests that the US is less mobile and less redistributive than continental
Europe.1 In our paper, political economy forces that constraint the development of public
education also lead to a lower degree of social mobility. Thus, our model predicts a positive
correlation between social mobility and redistribution of income across countries.
3 A Simple Model of the Intergenerational Transmission
of Income
We ﬁrst setup the model and derive the intergenerational transmission equation for income and
talent. Then, we derive the ﬁrst and second moments of income and talent distributions and
discuss how these moments evolve in response to more progressive public policies.
3.1 Set-up of the Model
We consider an inﬁnite horizon overlapping generations economy populated by a measure one
of dynasties, i ∈ [0,1]. In each period t = 0,1,2,... two generations are alive, fathers and
sons. In each generation, earnings (which we also call “output” or “income” interchangeably)
are produced according to the production function Yi,t = f( t,Θi,t,Ui,t). The parameter  t
represents the public policy; Θi,t is father’s human capital or basic skill (e.g. IQ) which we call
“talent”; and Ui,t denotes a random and inelastic factor of production which represents “market
luck”. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the production function is given by:




where  t ∈ (0,1] and α ≥ 0.
Figure 1 shows the production function graphically. Public policy and its eﬀects are char-
acterized by two parameters,  t and α. The parameter  t characterizes the amount of redis-
tribution in the economy. A lower  t implies a more progressive public policy, but also more
1See the evidence in Section 5. See also Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for more on this point.
6distortions. This is shown visually in the left panel of Figure 1, where for given amount of talent
and market luck, a lower  t is associated with less output for the talented or lucky families, but
with more output for the less talented or unlucky families. The most natural example of the
public policy represented by  t is public education. In Section 5 we oﬀer evidence in line with
this interpretation of  t.2 Henceforth, a lower  t is called a more progressive public policy or
a more progressive educational system.
The parameter α characterizes the eﬃciency of public education. For a given  t, a higher
α implies that a smaller fraction of talents Θi,t gains from progressivity because the system
creates disincentives for high talented agents. In the right panel of Figure 1, the area to the
left of the intersection of the production function with the 45 degree line measures the gains
from progressivity. As α increases, this area becomes smaller relative to the area to the right
of the intersection of the production function with the diagonal, which measures the eﬃciency
costs of progressivity.3 Henceforth, a higher α denotes more distortions.
In each period t the following events take place:
1. Fathers produce output Yi,t according to equation (2), given the predetermined talent
Θi,t, market luck Ui,t and public policy  t.
2. Fathers choose the policy for their sons,  t+1, according to the institution or political
process P.
3. Sons are born with a random family endowment Vi,t+1. The random factor of production
Ui,t+1 is realized.
4. Fathers observe Vi,t+1 and Ui,t+1 and choose investment Ii,t to maximize the dynastic
utility, given resources Yi,t. Investment produces son’s talent according to the production
function Θi,t+1 = g(It,hiVi,t+1).
5. Fathers die, sons become fathers and the process repeats ad inﬁnitum.
For this Section we treat   as an exogenous parameter. In Section 4 we endogenize it. Son
i is born with random family endowment Vi,t+1, which, following Becker and Tomes (1979), is
2Pekkarinen, Uusitalo and Kerr (2008) show how the major Finnish educational reform in the 1970s decreased
the intergenerational elasticity of income from 0.30 to 0.23. Their ﬁnding is consistent with our interpretation
of µt.
3We do not restrict Θi,t to be smaller than unity. If in some period Θi,t ≤ 1 for all families i, we can think
the special case with α = 0 as a growth-enhancing reform that beneﬁts every family, with the least talented
families gaining relatively more.
7assumed to follow a “Galtonian” AR(1) process:
vi,t+1 = (1 − ρ1)ρ0 + ρ1vi,t + ǫi,t+1 (3)
where v = lnV (small caps denote logs of corresponding variables throughout the paper).
For every dynasty i, ǫi,t+1 is a white noise process with expected value E(ǫi,t) = 0, variance
Var(ǫi,t) = σ2
v and zero autocorrelations. We have 0 ≤ ρ1 < 1 and therefore the logarithm of
family endowment regresses towards the mean, has stationary expectation E(vi,t) = ρ0, and
has stationary variance Var(vi,t) = σ2
v/(1 − ρ2
1). The parameter ρ1 characterizes the cultural
or genetic inheritance of traits related to talent and income, and is assumed identical across
families i.
A second random component is represented by market luck, Ui,t+1, whose logarithm is a
white noise process, has variance σ2
u, and is independent to ǫi,t. The diﬀerence between Ui,t and
Θi,t is that the latter is an elastic factor of production. As a result, talent is aﬀected by the
ineﬃciencies associated with the policy  .
Fathers care about the quality of their children. They observe Vi,t+1 and Ui,t+1 and decide
how to allocate their predetermined income Yi,t into consumption Ci,t and investment Ii,t in





subject to the budget constraint:
Ci,t + Ii,t = Yi,t (5)
where Yi,t+1 is children’s income.4 The parameter γ > 0 captures the degree of parental altruism,
with higher values denoting smaller altruism. Parental investment Ii,t can be thought as an
private educational input (e.g. tuition fees) that increases a child’s talent.
Sons’ talent is produced with the following production function:
Θi,t+1 = (hiVi,t+1)Ii,t (6)
where hi is a family-speciﬁc time-invariant ability eﬀect which allows dynasties to be ex-ante
heterogeneous. This heterogeneity captures long-run diﬀerences in market incomes, for instance
due to labor market discrimination against certain racial, ethnic or religious groups. We assume
that hi is distributed according to the density function φh with bounded support H ⊂ R++,
and is orthogonal to the disturbances ǫi,t+1 and ui,t+1.
4We assume that fathers cannot borrow against their son’s future income. See Loury (1981), Becker and
Tomes (1986) and Mulligan (1997), for an analysis of the relationship between social mobility and borrowing
constraints. See also Benabou (1996, 2000).
83.2 The Transmission of Income Across Generations
In this Section we restrict attention to steady state public policies, i.e. we set  t+1 =  t =   for
all t. Under this assumption, income and talent are stochastic processes with well deﬁned and
easy to analyze unconditional stationary moments. We generalize our analysis in Section 4,
where we endogenize the choice of  . Solving the problem in (4)-(5), using the production func-
tions (2) and (6), and taking logs, we obtain the equation that describes the intergenerational
transmission of income in family i:
yi,t+1 = δ0,i + δ1yi,t + δ2vi,t+1 + δ3ui,t+1 (7)
where:
δ0,i = δ0 + δi (8)
δ0 =  ln
 
 
  + γ
 
+ αln  (9)
δi =  lnhi (10)
δ1 =   (11)
δ2 =   (12)
δ3 =   (13)
The intercept δ0,i can be decomposed into two parts. δ0 is a common eﬀect across all dy-
nasties i, and δi is the dynasty-speciﬁc time-invariant eﬀect due to hi. Our autoregressive
coeﬃcient, δ1, is diﬀerent from the one in Becker and Tomes (1979) because we assume multi-
plicative (in levels) production functions for output and talent.5 While the previous literature
has focused on the role of private incentives for the intergenerational mechanism, our δ1 coeﬃ-
cient emphasizes instead the role of public policies. Speciﬁcally, the novel element of our model
5Goldberger (1989) explains in detail the diﬀerence between the additive production function (as in the
Becker and Tomes model) and the multiplicative production function. We also note that in our speciﬁc Cobb-
Douglas environment, the degree of parental altruism (γ) does not enter into the intergenerational transmission
equation directly, i.e. for given policy µ (see Solon, 2004, for a similar result).
9is that the slope δ1 is collectively decided by the fathers of each dynasty. Therefore, our mech-
anism maps collective action outcomes to equilibrium levels of intergenerational transmission
of income. In the Appendix we present the intergenerational transmission of talent.
3.3 The Trade-Oﬀ Between Equity and Eﬃciency
3.3.1 Expectations











1 −  
(14)
for all t. In (14), the expectation is conditioned only on hi to denote the dependency of long-run
income on long-run family ability hi. There are four ways through which the public policy  
aﬀects long-run income.






policy becomes more progressive (lower  ), the marginal propensity to invest in human
capital,  /(  + γ), is lower and as a result the long-run level of income tends to decline.
This eﬀect is identical for every dynasty i.
2. Direct Distortions in Output: This eﬀect is shown in the αln  term, and is associated
with the shifter  α in the production function for income in equation (2). The eﬀect of  
on output is more adverse when the parameter α increases.
3. Social Insurance or Beneﬁts of Public Education: The   term that multiplies the bracket
in the numerator of (14) captures the exponent of the term Θµ in equation (2). For low
ability dynasties (low hi), a more progressive public educational system increases long-
run income. The opposite happens for suﬃciently high ability families. The intuition is
shown in Figure 1.
4. Intertemporal Insurance or Social Mobility: This eﬀect is given by the denominator 1− 
and is associated with the slope of the intergenerational transmission of income δ2 in (7).
For suﬃciently low ability dynasties (low hi), the numerator is negative and the prospect
of upward mobility (lower  ) increases long-run income. For high ability dynasties, the
numerator is positive and increased mobility decreases their long-run income.
10We can write father i’s conditional (on the state of the system) expectation for son’s income
as the sum of the long-run level of income in (14) and the transitory deviation of current income
and current family endowment from their long-run levels:
Et(yi,t+1|hi) = E(yi,t+1|hi) +  (yi,t − E(yi,t+1|hi)) +  ρ1 (vi,t − ρ0) (15)
where the time subscript in the left hand side denotes conditioning on the information set as of
period t (which is summarized by father’s income, yi,t, and family endowment, vi,t). As we show
in Section 4.1, fathers take into account how progressivity aﬀects this conditional expectation
when voting for  .
This analysis highlights two important points. First, there is a trade-oﬀ between equity
and eﬃciency. Second, there is political conﬂict over the equilibrium level of social mobility.
In particular, as we discuss more formally in Section 4.2, fathers with higher ability hi or with
favorable shocks in their market activity, ui,t, or in their family endowment, vi,t, prefer less
progressive policies. It is this heterogeneous eﬀect of   on dynastic welfare that makes the
political economy aspect of the model interesting and supports our argument that politico-
economic determinants may be signiﬁcantly associated with mobility outcomes.
3.3.2 Variances
To understand the implication of our model for inequality, we ﬁrst consider the stationary,




1 −  2
1 + ρ1 







1 −  2σ
2
u (16)
Inequality across generations occurs because the disturbances ǫi,t+1 and ui,t+1 have diﬀerent
realizations across time for a given family i. From inspection of (16), we see that a more
progressive system (lower  ) reduces the variability of income. In addition, it lowers the fraction
of variability attributed to family luck vi,t+1. Intuitively, market luck ui,t+1 matters only for the
ﬁnal production of income, while family luck vi,t+1 aﬀects both the production of talent directly,
and the production of ﬁnal output indirectly (through talent). As a result, more progressive
public policies reduce the relative importance of the latter in the intergenerational variance of
income.
If all families were identical, then the variance that families face across generations in (16)
coincides with the stationary inequality in the cross section of families. More in general, with
heterogeneous families, the ex-post or cross-sectional variance of income can be decomposed in
11two parts:6
Var(yi,t+1) = Var(yi,t+1|hi) + Var(E(yi,t+1|hi)) (17)




(1 −  )2 (18)
To summarize, in (17) the stationary total inequality in the cross section of families is
decomposed into the dynastic variability in the process for income—common to all families
i—and the inequality that arises because heterogeneous families have diﬀerent levels of long-
run income. It is immediate to see that a more progressive educational system reduces all
inequalities. In the Appendix we also discuss the variance of talent.
3.3.3 Covariances
Consider now the intergenerational correlation of income. This summary statistic is what
the literature calls social mobility, inequality across generations or “equality of opportunity”.
Conditioning on hi, we distinguish the intergenerational correlation of income within family,
Corr(yi,t+1,yi,t|hi), from the correlation we may observe in the data when families are het-
erogeneous, Corr(yi,t+1,yi,t). The latter is discussed in Section 4.3 in relation to the Galton-
Becker-Solon regression. Consider the time series of output and talent for some family i with
time-invariant ability level hi. Given that we are in a stationary state with Var(yi,t+1|hi) =





(  + ρ1)σ2
v +  (1 − ρ1 )(1 − ρ2
1)σ2
u
(1 + ρ1 )σ2




For talent, the correlation Corr(θi,t+1,θi,t|hi) is given in Appendix 1.
3.4 Summary
In Proposition 1 we summarize how a more progressive public policy (lower  ) aﬀects the
moments of income and talent.
Proposition 1. Eﬀects of Progressivity on Income and Talent: In any stationary state,
with a time invariant public policy 0 <  t+1 =  t =   ≤ 1 we have:
6In (16) the variance is not indexed by i and as a result Ehi (Var(yi,t+1|hi)) = Var(yi,t+1|hi). The variance
of income is common to all families i because hi enters multiplicatively into the production of talent (6). The
same comment applies for the intergenerational correlation of incomes, in Section 3.3.3. In a more general
version of our model, we could allow for heterogeneity in the returns to investment (e.g. with a production
function of the form: Θi,t = (hiVi,t+1)I
ξi
i,t). Under this speciﬁcation the slope of the regression (δ1) in equation
(7) depends on i.
121. A more progressive system (lower  ) decreases / increases long-run income and talent
for suﬃciently high / low hi families. A more progressive system favors families with
temporarily low output, yi,t < E(yi,t+1|hi), and it favors families with temporarily low
family endowment, vi,t < ρ0.
2. The dynastic variance of income, Var(yi,t+1|hi), and the dynastic variance of talent,
Var(θi,t+1|hi), are increasing in  . Var(yi,t+1|hi)/Var(θi,t+1|hi), i.e. the intra-family
ratio of intergenerational inequalities, is bounded above by 1, and is increasing in  .
3. The cross sectional inequality of income Var(yi,t+1) and the cross sectional inequality of
talent Var(θi,t+1) increase in  . Their ratio is bounded above by 1 and also increases in
 .
4. The dynastic intergenerational correlation of income Corr(yi,t+1,yi,t|hi) is increasing in
 . The ratio Corr(yi,t+1,yi,t|hi)/Corr(θi,t+1,θi,t|hi) is smaller than 1, and increases in
 .
Proposition 1 shows how a more progressive public policy decreases the dynastic and cross
sectional inequalities of income and talent, and also decreases the within-dynasty intergenera-
tional correlation of income. These two predictions are consistent with the general equilibrium
eﬀects of educational subsidies as derived recently in Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2007).
They also tend to imply a positive comovement of the cross sectional and the intergenerational
inequality, as discussed in Solon (2004). Finally, our model predicts that in a society with no
public policy (  = 1), the ratio of variances and intergenerational correlations of income over
talent take their maximum value (unity). As public policy becomes more progressive these ra-
tios decrease. Intuitively, when the progressivity of public education increases, a given amount
of variation in the production of talent across time or across families matters less for ﬁnal
earnings in the market.7 In Section 5 we oﬀer some evidence in line with this prediction.
4 The Political Economy of Social Mobility
First, we deﬁne the politico-economic equilibrium. Then, we derive the equilibrium choice of
the public policy   in terms of deeper political, economic, cultural and genetic parameters.
7This result reﬂects the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients δ2 and λ2 (or δi and λi) in the two intergenerational
transmission equations. See Appendix for the details.
13Finally, we show the relationship between the equilibrium level of   and the slope of the
Galton-Becker-Solon regression, β.
4.1 Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In period t, father i observes and takes as given the realization of last period’s output, yi,t,
and endowment, vi,t. However, fathers do not know the realization of children’s endowment
vi,t+1 and market luck ui,t+1 before they vote for  t+1 and they need to form rational expecta-
tions. Father i’s preferences over public policies  t+1 are ordered according to the conditional
expectation of (4):




where s is the vector of structural parameters, and the conditional expectation, Et(yi,t+1|hi), is
given by (15). Ci,t is the optimal level of consumption:
Ci,t =
γ
 t+1 + γ
Yi,t (21)
which is a function of the public policy. Note that we reinstate the time subscript in  .
An important simpliﬁcation for deriving the equilibrium in our model is that sons are born
after fathers have chosen the public policy  t+1. As a result, sons do not aﬀect the choice
of  . Under this assumption, preferences of fathers over current policies are independent of
future policies, and there is no need to explicitly consider dynasties’ expectations about future
policy outcomes.8 This assumption is intuitive in the context of intergenerational mobility.
As we discuss in Section 5 in a cross section of OECD countries, it is public spending on
education—rather than other forms of government activity—that strongly correlates with social
mobility. Since public education is regarded as highly redistributive at the primary level, i.e.
before sons’ political rights are extended, our assumption captures this realistic feature of the
intergenerational transmission.
The policy that maximizes (20) is called the “most preferred policy for dynasty i”:
 i,t+1 =  (hi,yi,t,vi,t;s) = argmax
µ W( ;hi,yi,t,vi,t,s) (22)
8That is, the indirect utility W in (20) depends only on the current choice variable, µt+1, and not on future
public policies, µt+2,.... As a result, we do not have to consider the policy ﬁxed point problem that arises when
current policies depend on expectations of future policies but also aﬀect future policies through the optimal
consumption and investment choices and the resulting intergenerational transmission of income and talent. Our
setup resembles the equilibrium in the models of Persson and Tabellini (1994), Benabou (1996), and Fernandez
and Rogerson (1998), with “one period-ahead commitment to policy”. Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997)
show how to formulate and numerically solve for time-consistent politico-economic equilibria in a general class
of models. Hassler, Rodriguez Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2003) solve closed-form the Markov Perfect
Equilibrium in a non trivial dynamic voting game under the assumption of risk neutrality.
14The most preferred policy for every father reﬂects various trade-oﬀs. First, it reﬂects the
four channels that aﬀect the long-run value of income in Section 3.3.1. In addition, transitory
deviations from long-run income and transitory deviations from long-run family endowment also
aﬀect the most preferred policy, as shown in equation (15). Finally, public policy allocates re-
sources intertemporally and creates a trade-oﬀ across generations. The consumption-investment
ratio for every father is γ/ t+1. A less progressive system (higher  t+1) distorts less the in-
centive of parents to privately invest in their children talent and therefore when  t+1 decreases
parents transfer more resources to the next generation.
To solve the model we deﬁne a relevant family-speciﬁc summary of the system which we
call “income potential”, Qi,t. Income potential therefore summarizes the history of all relevant
market and family shocks. Our functional form assumptions—log preferences and multiplicative
production functions—imply that income potential for family i at time t is the log-sum of three
terms: life-long ability level lnhi, current log income, yi,t, plus a term proportional to log family
endowment, vi,t.
Qi,t = lnhi + yi,t + ρ1vi,t (23)
Proposition 2. Preferences over Public Policy:
1. Induced preferences over  i,t+1 as described by W(.) in (20) are single-peaked if (but not
only if) α > 1 for any Qi,t.
2. The most preferred policy  i,t+1 is strictly increasing in Qi,t.
The ﬁrst part of the Proposition establishes a suﬃcient condition for the indirect utility
W to be single-peaked. The second part shows that families with higher income potential
prefer less progressive public policies. Families with high income potential may be families
from advantaged groups (high hi) or families that face favorable economic (yi,t > E(yi,t+1|hi))
or cultural (vi,t > ρ0) shocks. Therefore, in our model families from disadvantaged social groups
(low hi) may still prefer less progressive public policies, if their last generations experienced
good luck in the market or in the production of talent.
Because transitory shocks aﬀect preferences for public policies, in general the equilibrium
policy will not be time invariant, as assumed for simplicity in Section 3. The easiest but
most restrictive way to proceed is to assume a pre-commitment institution in which the initial
generation of fathers observe {yi,0,vi,0,hi} and choose once and for all a time invariant system
 , which by assumption remains active in all future periods. A second possibility is to consider
15the stochastic steady state of the model, in which the distribution of income potentials in the
population is stationary. In this case, the optimal   remains constant in time, but the identity
of the decisive family is allowed to vary, since in the steady state families are hit by diﬀerent
market and family shocks. Under both these cases, the analysis for the long-run moments in
Section 3 applies, and the time invariant coeﬃcients for the stochastic processes are given by
the optimal stationary  . Finally, we can apply our comparative statics to the most general
case, when the dynastic variance and the public policy depend on calendar time along the
transitional dynamics in a period-by-period decision making process. Under this setting, the
equilibrium public policy (yet to be deﬁned) will in general depend on the current state Qi,t of
the decisive father.9
Let the distribution of income potential in the cross section of dynasties at time t be Φt(Q) =
  Q
Ql,t φt(z)dz. We deﬁne the political institution in terms of the equilibrium outcome that it
implies.
Deﬁnition 1. Institution P: An institution P results in the public policy  e
t+1 mostly preferred
by the dynasty in the 100pth percentile of the income potential distribution Φt, i.e. the family
with an income potential such that p = Φt(Qi,t). We denote the decisive dynasty as Qp,t.
Our deﬁnition encompasses some commonly used institutions, both in the optimal policy
and in the political economy literature. Let the average income potential be ¯ Qt =
 
Qt zdΦt(z).
Then if p = Φt( ¯ Qt), one obtains the utilitarian social rule that maximizes the welfare of the






In reality, however, public policies are determined by the aggregation of known, conﬂicting
political interests. The leading choice in the political economy literature is the one person, one
9As a result, income and talent become regime switching stochastic processes, i.e. with time varying coeﬃ-
cients. One interesting and realistic case occurs if there is an adjustment cost associated with an educational
reform that aims to switch µ. In this case the process for output would be a threshold ARMA(2,1) process,
where the thresholds are deﬁned by the distribution of Qi,t in the cross section of families. For instance, sup-
pose that the ﬁxed costs of expanding the public schooling infrastructure are too prohibitive and therefore
µ can take only two values: 0 < µl < µh < 1. Assuming that in period t − 1, µt = µh was the optimal
grandfather’s choice, a majority of fathers support a switch of regime to µt+1 = µl, if
  K













µl −ρ0(1−ρ1) is a constant, φt denotes the probability distribution
of income potential in the cross section of dynasties as of the beginning of period t and Ql,t is the lowest realized
income potential. We index the distribution by t to show the possible dependency on µt and hence on calendar
time. Under this setting, the expectations, variances and intergenerational correlations derived in Section 3
hold within each educational regime.
16vote democratic institution. If α > 1, then by Proposition 2 induced preferences over policies
are single-peaked. As a result, the father with the median most preferred policy is the decisive
voter. By the second part of the same Proposition, this is the father with the median income
potential, Q50,t. Note that this formulation allows both the identity, and the income or the
family endowment of the decisive father to vary over time. Since the median father’s vote is
decisive, it follows that p = 1/2 is the unique equilibrium outcome of the pure majority rule
game (i.e. the Condorcet winner).
More in general, we can allow for p > 1/2, capturing campaign contributions or more
active political participation of the rich fathers. Alternatively, a higher p may parameterize the
ideologically diverse preferences for parties of the poor fathers, as in the probabilistic voting
model. If p < 1/2, then social preferences are averse to inequality and can be thought to
internalize the ex-ante variance given in (18). From a political economy point of view, a lower
p may capture the bargaining power of socialist parties or labor organizations in unionized
economies. In the limit, p = 0 leads to the “Rawlsian institution” that maximizes the welfare
of the least well-oﬀ dynasty. Henceforth, we parameterize political preferences with p. In
Section 5 we show how to measure this key parameter in the data.
4.2 Politico-Economic Determinants of Social Mobility
Given this deﬁnition, the properties of the equilibrium level of the public policy,  e
t+1, are given
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. Equilibrium Public Policy: The equilibrium policy  e
t+1 is increasing both
in α and in p. It increases in hp, yp,t, vp,t and in ρ0, it decreases in γ, and it does not depend
on σ2
v and σ2
u. It increases in ρ1 if and only if vi,p − ρ0 > 0.
This Proposition shows how public education becomes less progressive (higher  t+1) when
output costs α increase, but more progressive as the position of the decisive dynasty in the
income potential distribution p decreases. Our result shows that, as long as optimally chosen
public policies have the potential to aﬀect intergenerational mobility (which in our model is
shown in Section 4.3), there is no reason to expect that a collective action of fathers transmits a
perfectly mobile society to their sons ( e = β = 0). It is important to note that for the refusal
of this proposition, one would need to show both that the costs of progressive public policies
are negligible and that institutions favor the low ability families. This is an interesting point,
because empirically it may be diﬃcult to ﬁnd evidence for the magnitude of α or in reality some
17public reforms may entail small eﬃciency costs (Lindert, 2004). On the other hand, a recent
strand of research in political economy points out that various politico-economic outcomes can
be simply explained by the fact that rich families have a larger “say” in the political equilibrium,
i.e. that the political system is wealth-biased (Benabou, 1996; Campante, 2007; Alesina and
Giuliano, 2009; Barenboim and Karabarbounis, 2009).
What is the novelty of our results? Most of the existing literature following the initial
Becker and Tomes (1979) contribution has attributed to the reduced-form coeﬃcient in (1)
a speciﬁc meaning for social mobility, namely that equality of opportunity is desirable.10 If
equality of opportunity is however costly for private incentives, more of it is not necessarily
desirable.11 Relative to these views, our model emphasizes—in addition to standard incentive
costs—political economy constraints that may further limit or enhance the extent of social
mobility. For instance, in our model perfect social mobility may be optimal under a utilitarian
institution (if α is very small), but not politically sustainable if rich families and business
interests restrict the development of the welfare state and the provision of public education (i.e.
if p is suﬃciently high). To put it diﬀerently, two societies with similar dynastic fundamentals
may display very diﬀerent degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on which is the
decisive dynasty selected by the existing political institutions.
The politico-economic trade-oﬀ behind our model can be conceptualized by a decline in the
position of the decisive voter p. Societies in which families with lower income potential have
a larger “say” for the equilibrium outcome, choose more progressive systems, expect higher
mobility and lower inequality. However, progressivity results in a lower long-run level of income
for suﬃciently high ability families, and may even lower average income.12 In our model, if the
distribution of income potential φt is right skewed (Q50 < ¯ Q)—perhaps because the ability
distribution φh is skewed—then a majority voting of fathers chooses a more progressive public
10Becker and Tomes (1979; abstract and page 1182) argue that “Intergenerational mobility measures the
eﬀect of a family on the well-being of its children.” (emphasis added). Another inﬂuential contribution is that
of Mulligan (1997, page 25), who in deﬁning social mobility notes that “The degree of intergenerational mobility
is [...] an index of the degree of ‘equality of opportunity’. Equality of opportunity is often seen as desirable
because, with little correlation between the incomes of parents and children, children from rich families do not
enjoy much of a ‘head start’ on children from poor families.”. The same presumption may be implied by the
introductory paragraph in Solon (1999).
11Piketty (2000) and Corak (2006) make this point. In an inﬂuential paper, Atkeson and Lucas (1992) have
shown the optimality of zero mobility. Recently, Phelan (2006) and Farhi and Werning (2007) challenge this
result based on the social discount rate exceeding the private one.
12We have not explicitly considered the growth enhancing eﬀects of public education. However, if average
ability ¯ h is suﬃciently low, then in the steady state the stationary average income in the cross section of the
dynasties,
 
H E(yi,t+1|h)dΦh(h), is decreasing in µ, and the progressivity increases long-run income, which
implicitly may be capturing this realistic feature of public education.
18policy relative to the utilitarian optimum. Holding average income potential ¯ Q constant, an
increase in the (right) skewness of the distribution of income potentials, leads the majority of
fathers to demand more progressive policies and higher social mobility.
Interestingly, the eﬀects of a higher ex-ante inequality in abilities, Var(lnh), due for instance
to market discrimination against ethnically or racially diverse groups, depend on the political
process p. If p is low, then higher Var(lnh) could be associated with more skewness and hence
a poorer decisive voter which results in more progressive policies. On the other hand, if de facto
political power is ultimately related to income potential and hence p is relatively high, a higher
ex-ante variability could be associated with more powerful elites, less progressivity and lower
social mobility. In Section 5 we oﬀer some suggestive evidence in favor of the second eﬀect. In
the Appendix we discuss in more detail the intuition behind the other comparative statics of
our model.
4.3 Structural Politico-Economic Interpretation of the Galton-Becker-
Solon (GBS) Regression
Our theoretical framework oﬀers a structural interpretation for the log-linear intergenerational
earnings model which is estimated in the empirical literature cited in Section 2. The literature
typically focuses on the Galton-Becker-Solon (GBS) regression:
yi,t+1 = a + βyi,t + εi (25)
where yt+1 and yt denote son’s and father’s life-long log earnings in the population. Previous
models have recognized that β is a function of genetic and cultural inheritance, altruism,
technological parameters and the structure of the asset market. However, we show that this
coeﬃcient also depends on political economy variables which determine the institutions that a
generation puts in place to insure its oﬀspring from adverse shocks.
Proposition 4. Population Slope of the GBS Regression: The slope in the population
regression of son’s on father’s income, β, also known as the intergenerational elasticity of income
is given as follows.13
1. If the economy is in a stationary state with  e
t+1 =  e
t =  e, then the intergenerational
elasticity equals the intergenerational correlation of incomes and is given by:













13Note that in both cases β is expressed only as a function of the deeper parameters of the model.
19where the variance in the denominator refers to the cross sectional variance in (17) and  e
is the equilibrium public policy deﬁned in Proposition 3. The intergenerational elasticity
β increases in  e and in p.
2. If the economy is for a long time in the steady state  e
t =  e
t−1 = ..., but in t + 1 an
unexpected structural break in the political institution p happens, then the intergenerational
elasticity is given by:



















In this case βt+1/βt =  e
t+1/ e
t and the ratio is increasing in pt+1/pt.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition refers to the special case in which the economy is in an
steady state with constant intergenerational mobility (the coeﬃcient β) and cross-sectional
variances. The second part considers instead the case in which a political shock at time t
determines a change of the decisive dynasty such that intergenerational mobility changes with
respect to previous periods (βt+1  = βt−i for i ≥ 0) and cross-sectional income variances may
diﬀer across generations. In principle, analogous formulas can be obtained for other shocks
aﬀecting the intergenerational elasticity of incomes and cross-sectional variances, but given the
focus of this paper here we study the case of a political shock.
Under the assumption that the advanced economies for which an estimate of β is available
are essentially characterized by a fairly similar set of economic and biological fundamentals,
diﬀerences in the estimated β for these countries should correlate with diﬀerences in the dynasty
that has decisive power in the political process. To put it diﬀerently, if economic and biological
fundamentals are more similar than political equilibria across these advanced economies, we
should observe more mobility in countries in which the position of the decisive dynasty is lower
in the hierarchy of dynastic income potentials. The empirical exercise in the next section should
be interpreted as a suggestive assessment of the extent to which political economy variables
that proxy for the decisive dynasty capture the cross-country variation in β.
However, equations (26) and (27) emphasize also other more traditional determinants that
might explain the cross country variability in β. For example, in steady state and for given
decisive dynasty, social mobility increases (β decreases) with market luck variability (higher
σ2
u), and decreases with ex-ante heterogeneity (higher Var(lnhi)). It decreases with output
costs (higher α), with the ability of the decisive family (higher Qp), with the long-run family
20endowment (higher ρ0) and with the degree of altruism (higher γ). Greater market variability
increases cross sectional inequality and makes the position of children highly uncertain, thereby
increasing social mobility. For the same reason, the comparative static with respect to σ2
v and
ρ1 is theoretically ambiguous. α, p, hp, ρ0, and γ aﬀect social mobility indirectly, through
the equilibrium level of   (see Appendix for these comparative statics). Finally, note that our
model predicts that ex-ante heterogeneity Var(lnhi) aﬀects positively β only conditional on
 . Higher ex-ante heterogeneity may operate also indirectly through public policy, and it may
increase (if it is associated with smaller p) or decrease (under higher p) social mobility.
5 Empirical Evidence on the Politico-Economic Deter-
minants of Mobility
In this Section we turn to the empirical evidence on the predictions of the model. Speciﬁcally,
we present evidence on the relationship between political variables that our model indicates as
important determinants of social mobility and observed measures of mobility across countries
or within country over time. We stress that this evidence needs to be interpreted only as
suggestive and descriptive. The number of countries for which we have data is limited, and the
available data are not suﬃciently informative to identify causal relationships. Nevertheless, the
evidence is generally consistent with the predictions of our model and in particular, it supports
a positive cross country and within country correlation between proxies for p and estimates of
β.
We consider ﬁrst an interesting case study which represents a salient example of a political
shock as described in equation (27). Over the past few decades, the UK has experienced
a tremendous decline in social mobility. In particular, Blanden, Gregg and Macmillan (2007)
document a 50% decline in social mobility between the 1958 and the 1970 cohorts. Such decline
has generated widespread concern among the public and has prompted the government in 2009
to issue a White Book that addresses the causes and implications of the decline in mobility.
Blanden, Gregg and Macmillan (2007) argue that the main cause of the decline is represented
by changes in educational attainment of diﬀerent income groups.
Their evidence is consistent with our model. However, our model goes further and indicates
that educational policies are likely to be an endogenous outcome. According to our framework,
the ultimate determinant of the decline in social mobility should be a change in societal prefer-
ences for redistribution. Indeed, this prediction is consistent with the sharp change in political
21preferences which led Margaret Thatcher to become Prime Minister in 1979. The Thatcher
revolution was caused by a clear move toward the right by the UK electorate, as indicated by
the fact that public expenditure for education fell, the power of the unions declined, regressive
VAT taxes increased, and more progressive corporate and income taxes declined.14
Turning to cross country evidence, credible estimates of β are available only for a limited
number of countries. We use estimates from Corak’s (2006) meta-analysis conducted for 9
OECD countries and complement these with 3 more observations. In the Appendix we discuss
more in detail the construction of our dataset and the sources.15
In Figure 2, the vertical axis shows estimates of β for a cross section of advanced democratic
OECD countries. Consistent with what has long been documented in the existing literature
on mobility, the UK, US and France are the least mobile, while Northern European countries
appear the most mobile. Canada is the most mobile Anglo-Saxon country, and Sweden is the
least mobile among the Nordic countries. The existing literature has mostly focused on the left
panel of the Figure (for example: Corak, 2006), which shows a positive bivariate association
between β and the private return to schooling. The right panel, which is more novel, depicts a
negative association between β and public expenditure on education. The Figure shows that the
correlation between social mobility and public expenditures for education is at least as strong
as the correlation between the private internal return to education and mobility.16 When we
divide public expenditure in education per student as a percentage of per capita GDP at the
primary, secondary and tertiary level, we ﬁnd that all are negatively correlated with β. Notably
and consistent with our model, the correlation is stronger at the primary level, where public
expenditures are arguably more redistributive.17
To obtain a direct measure of political preferences (the parameter p in the model), we
14VAT taxes rose around 15%, and each of the corporate tax rate and the top marginal income tax decreased
by 17%. Public expenditure for education as a percentage of GDP decreased by 25% between 1975 and 1985
and by 30% by the end of the 1980s.
15In the following Figures we use Corak’s most preferred estimate, but we have veriﬁed the robustness of our
results using the median estimate found in the literature. The nine countries are Denmark, Norway, Finland,
Canada, Sweden, Germany, France, US and the UK. We also add Japan, Spain and Australia. Some recent
papers have estimated the intergenerational income elasticity in Italy, but: (i) the estimates are based on heroic
assumptions needed to use intergenerational income data of low quality; (ii) the estimates are especially high
and (iii) even using a more conservative value, Italy is most of the times a major outlier of which we cannot
be really conﬁdent. The only variable that seems to explain satisfactory Italy’s low degree of mobility is the
strength of family ties (high ρ1).
16Conditioning on both determinants, the latter turns out to be much more strongly associated with mobility
than the former (correlation of -0.43 versus 0.15).
17In contrast, the correlation of β with total government spending is -0.05, and the correlation of β with
spending on social expenditures is -0.11. The weakness of these correlations illustrates that it is educational
expenditure, rather than other forms of government spending (e.g. unemployment insurance, assistance to poor
families, welfare beneﬁts, etc.), that may matter for social mobility.
22use data from the World Value Surveys (WVS).18 We focus on the diﬀerential in political
participation between low income voters and middle and upper income voters. The income
classiﬁcation follows the WVS and is standardized by country. As Table 1 shows, on average,
around 33% of the population is classiﬁed as “poor” (low-income). Variation across countries
is not large.19 Political participation can be measured with a variety of variables. In Figure
3 we measure political participation with membership in political parties. The vertical axis
in the Figure measures inequality in party aﬃliation, deﬁned as the fraction of middle and
upper income voters who are members of political parties divided by the fraction of low income
voters who are members of political parties. A lower value for this index denotes a relatively
more politically active class of low income families and hence a lower p. Note that we are not
interested in the political participation of the poor per se, but in their participation relative
to that one of other income groups in the same country. Our measure of relative participation
therefore holds constant other country-speciﬁc factors that may aﬀect political participation.
The correlations in Figure 3 are consistent with the model. The bivariate correlations of the
political inequality index with public spending and intergenerational elasticity are, respectively,
-0.49 and 0.79.20 When we use an alternative measure of the gap in political participation that
compares participation by high income voters to participation by with low income voters (thus
excluding middle income voters), the correlation is even stronger.
The existing literature has argued that one of the most important empirical determinants
of social mobility is the rate of return to human capital (see for example Solon, 1999 and 2004;
Corak, 2006). When we regress β on estimates of the return to schooling, we ﬁnd that the return
to schooling explains only 8% of the cross country variation. Notably, and consistent with our
model, our measure of inequality between rich and the poor families in political aﬃliation
explains 42% of the variation in social mobility.21 We have repeated this exercise with four
other measures of political participation: participation in labor unions, interest in politics,
signing petitions and participating in lawful demonstrations. We ﬁnd that the patterns are
similar to those presented, with the bivariate correlations ranging from 0.43 to 0.63. (Results
available upon request.)
18In a previous version of the paper we used voter turnout in elections and union density as additional proxies
for p. For all cases we ﬁnd correlations between p, µ and β that are consistent with our model.
19Sweden and Germany are the two outliers.
20This ﬁnding is robust to the exclusion of outliers.
21One of the few studies that attribute cross country diﬀerences in mobility to public policies is Corak and
Heitz (1999). The authors conjecture that Canada’s progressivity can explain its higher mobility relative to the
US.
23In Figure 4 we investigate the relationship between the degree of heterogeneity in a society,
public education and social mobility. Our model predicts that higher ex-ante heterogeneity
(higher Var(lnhi)) should be associated with more public spending and therefore higher social
mobility if p is low. If p is high, more heterogeneity should be associated with higher talent (hp)
for the decisive family, and less progressivity. Our empirical proxy for heterogeneity is an index
of ethnolinguistic fragmentation measured in 1961.22 The upper left panel shows that more
diverse countries are associated with less public spending on education. Our model explains
this positive correlation only if p is relatively high, which as discussed above is consistent with
recent theoretical and empirical literature. The bottom panel shows that the predicted link
between heterogeneity and mobility is also supported by the data. The bivariate correlation is
0.26. Excluding the very heterogeneous and mobile Canada, the correlation increases to 0.67.
Another prediction of the model has to do with the strength of cultural transmission ρ1. As
a proxy, we use an index of weak family ties.23 Weaker family ties proxy for a lower ρ1 in our
model. In Figure 4, weaker family ties are associated with more public provision of education
and more mobility. This lends support to the view that strong family ties and strong social
policies are substitutes.
We conclude with a ﬁnal piece of evidence. Becker and Tomes (1979) original contribution
aimed at explaining within a uniﬁed economic model the degree of cross sectional inequality,
and its relation with intergenerational inequality. We proxy for cross sectional inequality in
earnings, Var(yi,t), with the Gini coeﬃcient for gross earnings. The variance in talent or skills,
Var(θi,t), is proxied by the Gini coeﬃcient for factor income.24 In our sample the bivariate
association between cross sectional gross earnings inequality and intergenerational inequality
is around 0.72. Within the context of our model, market variability, σ2
u, explains the lack
of perfect correlation. Higher variability increases cross sectional inequality to a degree that
ultimately raises social mobility.25
Proposition 1 implies that the ratio of gross earnings over factor inequality should decline
when the progressivity of the educational system increases (  decreases). Figure 5 shows a
strong association between the ratio of the Gini coeﬃcients and public expenditure in educa-
22The index is deﬁned as one minus the probability that two random persons in some country belong to the
same ethnic, linguistic or racial group.
23The index is due to Alesina and Giuliano (2007). We thank the authors for providing us with their data.
24These statistics come from Milanovic (2000).
25Bj¨ orklund and J¨ antti (1997) hypothesize that common causes may explain US’s higher intergenerational
and cross sectional inequality relative to Sweden’s. Recently, Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2007) argue
that inequality and mobility may be positively correlated if labor market institutions diﬀer signiﬁcantly across
countries or negatively correlated if educational subsidies drive the cross country variation.
24tion. It also shows the direct relationship between the deeper determinant p and the ratio of
inequalities Var(yi,t)/Var(θi,t) that can rationalize this association. In particular, our model
predicts that in societies where the poor participate more in political parties, redistributive
public education takes place and therefore the ratio of income over talent inequality decreases.
The right panel of the ﬁgure is consistent with this prediction.
6 Conclusion
Intergenerational mobility emerges from “nature”, “nurture” and endogenous public policies.
While the previous literature has derived social mobility as a function of the optimizing be-
havior of utility-maximizing families, in this paper we generalize the structural log-linear social
mobility model and endogenize the political process that aggregates conﬂicting preferences for
intergenerational mobility.
Our model provides a structural interpretation of the widely-studied Galton-Becker-Solon
reduced-form coeﬃcient β. This is important because it allows a better understanding of the
deeper economic determinants of intergenerational mobility and the role of public policy. We
show that public policies generate a trade-oﬀ between insurance and incentives. Our model
adds to this knowledge by pointing out that even if insurance is relatively costless to provide, a
less than perfectly mobile society is possible because of political economy constraints in a world
of heterogeneous interests. In other words, two societies may have the same set of dynastic
fundamentals such as parental altruism, level of GDP, asset markets, ethnic fragmentation and
cultural traits, but diﬀerent political institutions, in which case social mobility outcomes will
diﬀer.
We conclude with some empirical evidence that lends support to our claim that politico-
economic variables are likely to be important determinants of cross country diﬀerences in social
mobility.
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28Table 1: Classiﬁcation in Poor, Middle and Rich Per Country: WVS Data
% Poor % Middle % Rich
Australia 29 34 37
Canada 31 36 33
Denmark 31 41 28
Finland 33 33 34
France 33 37 30
Germany 39 33 28
Japan 32 36 32
Norway 35 40 25
Spain 30 44 26
Sweden 26 44 31
UK 35 35 30
US 35 36 29
Average 33 37 30
Notes: Percentages are rounded to sum to 100. The numbers refer to the full sample from the Four
Wave WVS Data. Actual percentages used in the empirical results may diﬀer slightly depending on
the political variable used.
29Figure 1: The Production Function Yi,t =  α
t (Ui,tΘi,t)
µt









































Notes: Market luck is set to Ui,t = 1.
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Notes: The left panel shows the relationship between the intergenerational earnings elasticity β and the private rate of return to tertiary
education. The right panel shows the relationship between the intergenerational earnings elasticity β and the public expenditure in education
per student as a percentage of per capita GDP. See Appendix 2 for the data sources.
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Inequality Parties
Notes: The left panel shows the relationship between the public expenditure in education per student as a percentage of per capita GDP and
the variable “Inequality Parties”. The right panel shows the relationship between the intergenerational earnings elasticity β and the variable
“Inequality Parties”. The variable “Inequality Parties” (proxy for p) is deﬁned as the political party participation rate of the non-poor (middle
and high income) citizens divided by the political party participation rate of the poor citizens. See Appendix 2 for the data sources.
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Notes: The left panels show the relationship between the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, the public expenditure in education per student
as a percentage of per capita GDP (upper left), and the intergenerational earnings elasticity β (lower left). The right panels show the relationship
between the weakness of family ties, the public expenditure in education per student as a percentage of per capita GDP (upper right), and the
intergenerational earnings elasticity β (lower right). See Appendix 2 for the data sources.
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Inequality Parties
Notes: The left panel shows the relationship between the ratio of Gini coeﬃcients measured at the gross and the factor level and the public
expenditure in education per student as a percentage of per capita GDP. The right panel shows the relationship between the ratio of Gini
coeﬃcients measured at the gross and the factor level and the variable “Inequality Parties”. The variable “Inequality Parties” (proxy for p) is
deﬁned as the political party participation rate of the non-poor (middle and high income) citizens divided by the political party participation
rate of the poor citizens. See Appendix 2 for the data sources.
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4Appendix 1: Derivations and Proofs
A1. Derivation of Income and Talent Transmission Equations
First, forward the production function for output, equation (2), one period and solve for Θi,t+1:


















If we insert this equation into the budget constraint, Ci,t = Yi,t − Ii,t, we see that the
budget is concave for  t+1 ≤ 1, strictly when  t+1 < 1. Since the utility function (4) is strictly























Taking logs and letting  t+1 =   in (A.4) yields the income transition equation (7) in the
text, for the coeﬃcients deﬁned in (8)-(13). From (A.2) and the budget constraint we can also










 t+1 + γ
 
Yi,t (A.6)
To derive the intergenerational transmission equation for talent, we ﬁrst substitute the






























35Taking logs and setting  t+1 =  t =   gives the transmission equation for talent:
θi,t+1 = λ0,i + λ1θi,t + λ2vi,t+1 + λ3ui,t (A.9)
where:




  + γ
 
+ αln  (A.11)
λi = lnhi (A.12)
λ1 =   (A.13)
λ2 = 1 (A.14)
λ3 =   (A.15)
The talent transmission equation diﬀers from the income transmission equation due to the
coeﬃcients λ2 and λi (as opposed to the coeﬃcients δ2 and δi in the text). These coeﬃcients
measure the eﬀects of cultural and genetic endowment on talent and output, respectively. For
the case of talent, these eﬀects do not depend on  , since public policies are imposed on ﬁnal
output.
A2. Expected Income and Talent
First we show that given a stationary  , income and talent are stationary processes. Sub-
tracting ρ1yi,t from both sides of the income transmission equation (7), using the deﬁnition
for vi,t+1 in (3), and substituting in the resulting expression the fact that ρ1 (δ2vi,t − yi,t) =
−ρ1 (δ0,i + δ1yi,t−1 + δ3ui,t), we can express the income process in (7) as the sum of an ARMA(2,1)
process plus an independent white noise:
yi,t+1 = (1−ρ1)(δ0,i + δ2ρ0)+(δ1 +ρ1)yi,t +(−δ1ρ1)yi,t−1 +δ3ui,t+1 −δ3ρ1ui,t +δ2ǫi,t+1 (A.16)
The process is stationary if the roots of the characteristic equation, 1 − (δ1 + ρ1)x −
(−δ1ρ1)x2 = 0, lie outside the unit circle. The two roots are given by φ1 = − 1
ρ1 and
36φ2 = − 1
δ1 = − 1
µ. Therefore, the log income process is stationary for every family i, if ρ < 1
and   < 1. A similar reasoning applies for the talent process.
The unconditional expectation of log income for family i in equation (14) in the text is easy
to compute by setting E(yi,t+1) = E(yi,t) = E(yi,t−1) in (A.16) or (7). All comparative statics
for this expectation follow from inspection. From the talent transmission equation (A.9), we









1 −  
(A.17)
From the income transmission equation (7) we can compute the conditional expectation of
income:
Et(yi,t+1|hi) = E(yi,t+1|hi) +  (yi,t − E(yi,t+1|hi)) +  ρ1 (vi,t − ρ0) (A.18)
where the state of the system includes {yi,t,θi,t,vi,t,ui,t}, and E(yi,t+1|hi) is the unconditional
expectation given in (14). Similarly for talent we have:
Et(θi,t+1|hi) = E(θi,t+1|hi) +  (θi,t − E(θi,t+1|hi)) + ρ1 (vi,t − ρ0) (A.19)
A3. Variance of Income and Talent
To derive the unconditional, stationary variance Var(yi,t+1|hi) for dynasty i, we impose sta-
tionarity in (7) and recall that ui,t+1 is independent from vi,t+1 and yi,t:
(1 −  
2)Var(yi,t+1|hi) =  
2Var(vi,t+1) + 2 
2Cov(yi,t,vi,t+1|hi) +  
2Var(ui,t+1) (A.20)
To compute the covariance term, we use the stationarity of the process, the properties of




(1 − ρ1 )(1 − ρ2
1)
(A.21)
Substituting (A.21) into (A.20), using the deﬁnitions of the variances for vi,t+1 and ui,t+1
and rearranging we obtain the expression given in the text, (16). The same reasoning yields
the variance of talent for family i:
Var(θi,t+1|hi) =
1
1 −  2
1 + ρ1 







1 −  2σ
2
u (A.22)
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Because   < 1, the denominator exceeds the numerator in (A.23), and the ratio is smaller
than unity as claimed in Proposition 1. Next we prove the claim in Proposition 1 that this














where κ1 is the derivative of κ with respect to  . If the ﬁrst term in (A.24) is positive, then
our claim is proven. After some algebra, the suﬃcient condition reads as:
g( ,ρ1) =  ( 
2 − 1 −  ρ
2
1) > −1 (A.25)
Because the function g has minimum at -1, (ρ1 = 1 and   = 1), the suﬃcient condition holds
and the claim is proven.
Finally, we consider the inequality in the cross section of families. From (16) it is obvious
that Var(yi,t+1) increases in  . For talent we have:
Var(θi,t+1) = Var(θi,t+1|hi) +
1
(1 −  )2Var(lnhi) (A.26)
where the ﬁrst term in the right hand side of this equation is given by (A.22), and the last
term equals the variance of the unconditional expectation of talent (the variance of (A.17)). It
is straightforward to see that Var(θi,t+1) also increases in  . From (16) and (A.26), consider















where κ is deﬁned above. To prove the claim in Proposition 1 that this ratio also increases in
 , let us deﬁne τ =
1+µ
1−µ, with τ′ = 2τ
1−µ2. Then after some tedious but straightforward algebra,
























u + 2κ + τVar(lnhi)
 
(A.28)
The ﬁrst two terms of this expression are positive, as shown in (A.24) and (A.25). The
term 2τVar(lnhi)(2κ+τVar(lnhi))/ 3 is also positive. Therefore, after factoring out the term
σ2




 2) + 2
τ
 3 > 0 (A.29)
Plugging in the deﬁnitions of τ and τ′ and using the fact that   < 1, we can verify the
above inequality.
38A4. Intergenerational Correlation of Income and Talent
In this part we consider the intergenerational correlation within one dynasty i and treat hi as a
time invariant ﬁxed eﬀect. Because the variance is stationary, the stationary intergenerational








where we have used (7) and the properties of ui,t+1. To obtain the expression (19) in the text,























Because all terms are positive, the correlation is increasing in   and the claim in Proposition
1 is proven. A similar reasoning shows that the stationary intergenerational correlation of talent
is:
Corr(θi,t+1,θi,t|hi) =
(  + ρ1)σ2
v +  3(1 − ρ1 )(1 − ρ2
1)σ2
u
(1 + ρ1 )σ2
v +  2




Diﬀerently from income, the intergenerational correlation of talent has ambiguous compar-
ative static in  . A more progressive policy decreases both the covariance and the variance of
income and talent. For income, the rate of decrease in the variance is smaller than that of the
covariance and the comparative static is unambiguous. But in the case of talent, the covariance
is not suﬃciently decreasing because talent is not directly aﬀected by  . We can show that
the intergenerational correlation in talent is increasing in   provided that σ2
u is not too large
relative to σ2
v.
Finally, we prove the claim in Proposition 1 that the ratio of intergenerational correlations
is smaller than one and increasing in  . First, consider the ratio:
Corr(yi,t+1,yi,t|hi)/Corr(θi,t+1,θi,t|hi) =
(  + ρ1)(1 + ρ1 )σ4




u(1 − ρ1 )(1 − ρ2
1)( 2(  + ρ1) +   +  2ρ1)
(  + ρ1)(1 + ρ1 )σ4




u(1 − ρ1 )(1 − ρ2
1)( 3(1 + ρ1 ) +   + ρ1)
(A.33)




1)(1 − ρ1 )ρ1(  − 1)2. This diﬀerence is positive because σ2
v > 0, σ2
u > 0 and ρ1 < 1. As
a result, the expression in (A.33) is smaller than unity, strictly when   < 1, as claimed in
Proposition 1. In addition, the ratio is increasing in  . To see this, rewrite the ratio as:
39Corr(yi,t+1,yi,t|hi)/Corr(θi,t+1,θi,t|hi) =
(  + ρ1)
1+ρ1µ
(1−ρ1µ)2σ4







1−ρ1µ( 2(  + ρ1) +   +  2ρ1)
(  + ρ1)
1+ρ1µ
(1−ρ1µ)2σ4







1−ρ1µ( 3(1 + ρ1 ) +   + ρ1)
(A.34)
Denote by N the numerator and by D the denominator of this expression. The ratio
of correlations increases in   if and only if the derivate N′D − D′N is positive. Since the
denominator exceeds the numerator, D > N, it suﬃces to show that N′ > D′ > 0. From





1−ρ1µρ1(  − 1)2, we





(1−ρ1µ)2 > 0, which proves the claim.
A5. Proof of Proposition 2
Using the consumption function in equation (21) and the conditional expectation of income in
equation (15), we can express the indirect utility function as:
W( t+1;hi,yi,t,vi,t) =
= yi,t + ln
γ










γ +  t+1
 






where Qi,t = yi,t +ρ1vi,t +lnhi is family i’s income potential at time t. Diﬀerentiating W with






[W2 + W3 + W4 + W5 + Qi,t] (A.36)
In this expression, the term W1 = − 1






< 0 measures the beneﬁcial insurance eﬀects of public policy, W3 =
γ
µt+1+γ > 0 is
the term associated with the distortions in investment, W4 = α
µt+1 > 0 is the direct output cost,
W5 = ρ0(1 − ρ1) > 0 shows that insurance is less beneﬁcial the higher is the long-run level of












A suﬃcient condition for single-peaked preferences is the strict concavity of the indirect
utility. This requires that
µt+1γ
µt+1+γ < α. Since the left hand side of this inequality is bounded
above by 1, the ﬁrst part of the claim in Proposition 2 follows. For the second part of the
Proposition, set ∂W/∂ t+1 equal to zero, and use the Implicit Function Theorem and the










40A6. Proof of Proposition 3
If 0 <  i,t+1 < 1 is the most preferred public policy for a dynasty with parameter Qi,t, then it
necessarily satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition, ∂W/∂ t+1 = 0, where the derivative is given by
(A.36). In addition, if α > 1, then W is globally concave, and hence any solution to the ﬁrst
order condition will be the unique optimum. Since the Implicit Function Theorem applies, the
comparative static ∂ t+1/∂z has the same sign as the cross partial ∂2W( t+1(hi))/∂( t+1)∂z.
Therefore,
∂2W(µt+1)
∂µt+1∂α ∝ 1/ i,t+1 > 0,
∂2W(µt+1)
∂µt+1∂ρ0 ∝ 1 − ρ1 > 0,
∂2W(µt+1)
∂µt+1∂ρ1 ∝ vi,t − ρ0, and
∂2W(µt+1)
∂µt+1∂Qi,t = 1/γ > 0. Since the most preferred policy  t+1 of low Qi,t families is lower, it follows
that when the position of the decisive agent p decreases,  t+1 also decreases. For the parameter
that expresses the degree of parental altruism, after some algebra and using the ﬁrst order







We brieﬂy discuss the remaining comparative statics. First, social mobility is lower in soci-
eties with higher long-run income (higher ρ0). At a ﬁrst glance, this may appear counterfactual,
since the conjecture is that in less developed economies, social mobility is lower (Solon, 2002).
However, this could be because less developed economies have poorer tax collection technologies
(high α) and limited expansion of voting rights (high p).
Second, in the original Becker and Tomes (1979) model, altruistic parents invest more
in the human capital of their children which strengthens the intergenerational transmission
and lowers social mobility. This result also holds in our model, but it takes place through a
diﬀerent mechanism.26 Because a lower   distorts fathers’ investment decisions, a higher   (less
progressivity) redistributes resources in favor of the future generation. Hence, more altruistic
fathers transfer more resources to the next generation by choosing a higher  .
Third, if the decisive voter is temporarily well-endowed in family ability (vi,t > ρ0), then
cultural persistence decreases the progressivity of the public policy. This result is consistent
with the hypothesis that stronger family ties oﬀer insurance and therefore “crowd out” the
scope for social insurance.
Fourth, given the income potential Qp,t, the parameters σ2
v and σ2
u do not aﬀect the optimal
 . Because of the assumed log-log speciﬁcation, substitution and income eﬀects cancel oﬀ, and
26In our model, altruistic fathers invest more in their children human capital, holding constant µ. However,
because of the log linear speciﬁcation, altruism does not enter directly in the intergenerational transmission
equation. See Solon (2004) for a similar result.
41consumption and investment are constant fractions of output, independently of the properties
of the shocks. In a more general speciﬁcation of preferences, the scope for insurance will increase
when endowment and market luck become more variable. Nevertheless, the properties of the
two shocks can matter indirectly for  , through the evolution of the income potential in the
next period Qp,t+1. Therefore, the persistence and volatility of the equilibrium   are aﬀected
by cultural, genetic and market randomness.
A7. Proof of Proposition 4
First, we examine a stationary state with  t+1 =  t. The population coeﬃcient vector is deﬁned





(yi,t+1 − a − βyi,t)
2 
(A.40)





Cov(δ0 +  t+1 (lnhi + yi,t + vi,t+1 + ui,t+1),yi,t)
Var(yi,t)
(A.41)
which, from the imposed stationarity Var(yi,t+1) = Var(yi,t), also equals the cross sectional
intergenerational correlation, Corr(yi,t+1,yi,t). Recalling the properties of ui,t+1 and ǫi,t+1, we
have:







The ﬁrst covariance in the numerator is given by (A.21), because the ﬁxed eﬀect hi is
orthogonal to the ǫi,t+1 and hence the vi,t+1 process. The stationary covariance between the
family ﬁxed eﬀect and income is given by:
Cov(lnhi,yi,t) =
 t+1
1 −  t+1
Var(lnhi) (A.43)
Putting all pieces together and setting  t+1 =  t =  , yields the expression for β in Propo-
sition 4.
Next, we show that β is increasing in  . Using the variances in equations (16)-(18) yields:
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u + (1 − ρ2
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1−µ Var(lnhi)
(1 + ρ1 )σ2
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42Consider the last term in the numerator and the denominator. Because
1−ρ1µ
1−µ is increasing in
 , this term also increases in  . So, adding the same, increasing in  , term both in the numerator
and the denominator, tends, holding constant all other terms, to produce an increasing β,
because the numerator is smaller than the denominator. Furthermore, β will increase more in
  due to this last term, when Var(lnhi) is higher. Hence, consider Var(lnhi) = 0. In this case
(A.45) collapses to the dynastic correlation in (19). Previously in this Appendix, we showed
that this correlation is increasing in  , which completes the proof of the claim that β increases
in  .
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as claimed in Proposition 4. Diﬀerentiating (A.45) with respect to Var(lnhi), we obtain
∂β
∂Var(lnhi)












The comparative statics of β with respect to α, p, Qp,t, ρ1 and γ follow from Proposition 3
and the result ∂β/∂  > 0. Finally, we have veriﬁed numerically that   is non monotonic in ρ1
and σ2
v for various combinations of parameters.
Finally, for the second part of the Proposition we use the new equilibrium  t+1 in the AR(1)
process for income in (7). Var(yi,t) is given by (17) in the text for policy  t. The formulas for
Cov(lnhi,yi,t) and Cov(vi,t+1,yi,t) are taken by assuming that before the structural break the
economy is in a steady state with  t =  s for all s < t + 1.
43Appendix 2: Data
Social Mobility: Data for the intergenerational earnings elasticity is taken from Corak’s
(2006) meta-analysis. For Australia we use estimates from Leigh (2007). For Japan we use
estimates from Lefranc, Ojima and Yoshida (2008). For Spain we use estimates from d’Addio
(2007).
Private Return to Education: Taken from Boarini and Strauss (2007), Table 3. Calculated
as the simple average in every country for the years available (males and females).
Total Government Spending and Social Welfare Spending: Government spending de-
notes central government consumption and investment. Social Welfare denotes consolidated
government spending on social services as percentage of GDP. This data is taken from from
Persson and Tabellini (2003). The variables are averaged over the 1960-1998 period.
Public Education: Data taken from OECD’s Online Education Database. The series ex-
tracted are Public education expenditure as % of GDP, Public education expenditure per
student (% of p.c. GDP), at all levels, and Public education expenditure per student (% of
p.c.GDP), at the primary, secondary and tertiary level. For every country we average the series
for all available years in periods 1970-2007.
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF): Taken from Roeder (2001). The ELF index
is deﬁned as one minus the probability that two randomly chosen persons from a population
belong to the same ethnic, linguistic or racial group. A higher ELF index denotes a more
heterogeneous population. The value taken refers to the year 1961.
Gini Coeﬃcient: The Gini coeﬃcients at the factor and the gross earnings level are taken
from Milanovic (2000) and are averaged across all available periods for any given country.
Weak Family Ties: Taken from Alesina and Giuliano (2007).
Political Inequality Variables: Taken from the Four Wave World Values Survey. The po-
litical participation variables that we use are recoded in binary form as follows: Interested in
Politics (WVS code: E023; recoded as 1 for responders that answered 1 or 2, and 0 otherwise);
Belong to Political Party (A068; already binary); Sign Petitions (E025; 1 if the responder an-
swered yes and 0 otherwise); Participation in Lawful Demonstration (E027; 1 if the responder
answered 1 or 2, 0 otherwise); Belong to Labor Union (A067; already binary). The income
classiﬁcation follows the variable X047R; see also Table 1.
44